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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals exercises jurisdiction overt this 
matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2) (h), Utah Code, as amended 
and Section 780-45-10, Utah Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Set forth in Appellant's Brief and not required in 
Appellee's Brief. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the statutory provisions are Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-
7.15 and they are attached in the Addendum of this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were divorced and the Decree of Divorce was 
entered in Fourth District Court on February 27, 1996. The 
parties' Decree of Divorce, at paragraph 10 required the 
Appellant to be responsible for one-half of a n non-routine 
medical and dental expenses for the minor children. (See court 
record at page 56.) 
Appellee set the matter for an Order to Show Cause Hearing 
on June 29, 2001, before Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. The Appellant 
2 
was personally served with the Order to Show Cause, Affidavit in 
Support and Motion and the proof of personal service was filed 
with the court. (See Court record at page 113.) 
The Affidavit of the Appellee asked for the Appellant to pay 
his share of the medical and dental expenses for the minor 
children. (See court record at page 107) The Appellee asked 
for an award of attorney's fees. (See court record at page 106). 
The Affidavit of Appellee included copies of letters sent to 
Appellant requesting reimbursement for the medical and dental 
expenses for the minor children. (See court record at pages 105, 
104, 103 and 102.) 
No responsive pleading was made by the Appellant prior to 
the hearing. 
The matter came on as for hearing on June 29, 2001 and the 
Appellee provided testimony to the trial court and both counsel 
made arguments and proffers to the trial court. (See trial court 
record at page 149, which is the transcript of the hearing and 
specifically the transcript at pages 19 and 20, which contain the 
testimony of the Appellee.) 
Although the Appellant failed to file responsive pleadings 
prior to the hearing, such as an affidavit in response, the 
court did hear the arguments of both counsel regarding the issues 
before the Court. 
The Appellant's position regarding the request for a 
3 
judgment for orthodontic costs was that unless braces wer e 
medically necessary, the Appellant should not be required to pay 
for one-half of the costs and had refused to do so. (See 
transcript of hearing at page 7, lines 18 and 19 .) 
The Appellant never requested an evidentiary hearing, he 
only stated that unless an evidentiary hearing establishes that. 
the treatment was medical ly necessary, rather than cosmetic, the 
Appellant would not be required to pay for bxaces. (See 
transcript at page 7, lines 15-19) 
An Order on Order to Show Cause was th-ui signed by the Court 
on October 1, 2001. (See court record at pages 137, 136, 135 and 
134.) 
The Order on Order to Show Cause granted the Appellee a 
judgment in Lli*-1 ctnuHiiil nf $2,7ft0.75 as for orthodontia and 
$337.50 as for counseling costs, a judgment in the amount :U 
$244.7 5 as fM' attorney's fees and denied the Appellee's request 
for a judgment for insurance costs. ( See court i.ecorcl ,il pane 
136) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Regardless of when the Utah Code was amended the trial court 
did not abuse it's discretion when it issued a ruling as to 
insurance costs because the Appellee's Motion was denied d.u ; 
4 
Appellant had no motion before the Court for costs. 
The trial court did not abuse it's discretion when it 
entered an order granting judgment as for medical expenses 
because the Appellee had made a written request to be reimbursed 
for the cost of orthodontia, but the Appellant felt orthodontia 
was not a necessary medical expense. 
The trial court did not abuse it's discretion when it 
awarded attorney's fees to the Appellee because the Appellee 
prevailed at the hearing because. The award was within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
1 INSURANCE COSTS: The issue of insurance is that the 
Appellee requested a judgment for insurance costs. The request 
was denied. The Appellant had no motion for a judgment before the 
trial court and therefore, it is a moot point that the Appellee 
did not receive a judgment for insurance costs because she has 
not filed an appeal. 
2. MEDICAL EXPENSES: The issue of the judgment for medical 
expenses is that the Appellant appeared before the trial court 
and stated that he objected to paying for orthodontia because it 
was not a medical necessity, but a cosmetic treatment (see 
5 
transcript at page "', lines 4, 5, 12, 13, 18 and 19 ). Appellant 
compared braces to obtaining breast enlargement and stated, that 
it just was not "'medically necessary". (See transcript at page 
8, lines 23, 24 arid 25). 
The claims of the Appellant in the appeal ai e that the 
medical expenses were not substantiated by evidence. However, 
that claim is not supported by the evidence in t lie- file. The 
Appellee's affidavit contained four separate letters that 
informed the Appellant ui the costs for medical expenses. (See 
Court record at pages 105, 104, 103 and 102.) In addition, the 
Appellant admitted that I, had visited with the children's 
orthodontic surgeon, was aware of the costs and determined that 
because they were cosmetic that he declined to pay for the 
braces. (See transcript at page 26, line 14). 
The evidence presented at the hearing was that the Appellant 
did not agree with the nature . I I he medical treatment provided, 
(braces for the chi Idren) . He did request evi dence of the costs, 
but even with the -dl^i \ jr^-jr]^ the evidence of costs, it 
remained his contention that the braces were not a medical 
necessity. 
The trial court found the orthodontia to b>' medically 
necessary, and specifically found that the minor children would 
be "hindered in their lite by not ha viuq NIH ,Ytnodontia at this 
6 
point". See transcript at page 21, lines 17-24.) 
No case law was found by Appellee to support the Appellant's 
contention that he had the authority to approve or deny braces 
for his children. In addition, the Appellant cited to no case 
law in his brief in which the Appellant cited to any case or code 
that indicated that Appellant had the authority to make the 
determination that braces were not a medical expense. In the 
case of Beardall v Beardall, 629 P.2d 425, (1981) the Court 
examined the issue of the nature of what is a necessary medical 
expense and found that "The trial court, sitting as a court of 
equity, pertaining to it's powers concerning obligation arising 
under a decree of divorce exercised it's equitable powers and 
limited defendant's liability to the cost of the insurance 
premiums rather than ordering defendant to discharge the entire 
obligation for medical expenses in the sum of $3,395.24. Within 
this context, the trial court correctly ruled that the premiums 
were actually a medical expense for the children". (See case 
attached in the addendum ). The case states clearly that a trial 
court may determine whether or not something (such as 
orthodontia) is a medical expense necessary to the children. 
The Appellee complied with U.C.A. § 78-45-7.15(7) wherein 
she not only wrote the Appellant four letters informing him of 
the costs (Court file at pages 105, 104, 103 and 102), the 
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record shows that the Appellant actually visited with the doctor 
and made the determination that braces were recommended but he 
later stated that he would not pay for them. (Transcript at page 
26, line 24). 
In this case, the trial court heard the arguments of both 
parties and properly ruled that braces are a medical expense for 
the minor children. 
The Appellant's claim (Brief at page 14) that the Appellee 
did not provide proof regarding the claimed expenses until 
September, 2002 is irrelevant to the issue on appeal. While it 
may be relevant to any claim that the Appellant may have to avoid 
the enforcement of the judgment, it does not render the order of 
the court invalid or subject to appeal. The Order on Order to 
Show Cause, at paragraph 1, grants the judgment, subject to 
verification of costs. (Court file at page 136). If every order 
of a divorce court could be overturned because at some point 
following the issuance of the order, one of the parties did not 
act as ordered, there would be very few orders that would not be 
subject to appeal. 
The trial court's factual determinations are clearly 
erroneous only if they are in conflict with the clear weight of 
the evidence. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271-72 (Utah App. 
1990). The clear evidence in this case is that the Appellant 
elected not to pay any portion of the orthodontia and the court 
8 
did not agree with his position. 
3. ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARD: The attorney's fees award was 
also within the sound discretion of trial court. In Beardall v. 
Beardall 629 P. 2d. 425 (1981), the Defendant claimed that there 
was no evidence adduced as to the need of the Plaintiff regarding 
attorney's fees. In Beardall the Plaintiff was compelled to 
prosecute the hearing in order to enforce the medical expenses 
provision of the decree and the Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
award of fees. 
In this case, the Appellant absolutely refused to pay for 
any portion of the orthodontia needs of the minor children 
because he felt they were akin to breast implants. (Transcript, 
page 8, lines 23, 24, 25.) That refusal on the part of the 
Appellant was the factor that: forced Appellee to file a request 
for judgment with the trial court and thus, can be the basis for 
an award of attorney's fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The request for a judgment for insurance costs was denied 
and Appellee did not appeal that decision. 
The award of a judgment for medical expenses and attorney's 
fees was within the sound discretion of the trial court and the 
prayer for relief in the appeal should be denied. 
The Appellee should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs 
9 
in answering the Appellant's brief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this a day of April, 2003. 
t&*-
id Blakeloc 
fhey for Appel lee /Pet i t ioner 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
On this it ( I day of April, 2003, I served two copies of the foregoing to Gary Buhler, P.O. Box 2 2 ^ Grantsvil^g, Utah 84029-




78-45-7.15. Medical expenses. 
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children be 
provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost 
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for medical expenses, 
the court or administrative agency may consider the: 
(a) reasonableness of the cost, 
(b) availability of a group insurance policy; 
(c) coverage of the policy, and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent. 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the 
premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance 
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid 
The premium expense for the children shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the 
number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of children 
in the instant case. 
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the dependent 
children. 
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the 
other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or 
before January 2 of each calendar year The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of 
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U S C. Section 601 et seq., of 
any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he first 
knew or should have known of the change 
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and 
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment 
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent incurring medical 
expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other 
parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with Subsections (6) and (7). 
History: C 1953, 78-45-7.15, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 118, § 16; 1995, ch. 258, § 14. 
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority 
for the following administrative rule(s) R527-201. 
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and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement 
Annette K. BEARDALL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Neil J. BEARDALL, Defendant and Appellant 
629 P.2tf 425; 1981 Utah LEXIS 7€3 
No. 16994 
April 23,1981, Filed 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Richard J. Maughan, Chief Justice, wrote the opinion. I. Daniel Stewart, Justice, Richard C. Howe, 
Justice, and Dallin H. Oaks, Justice, concurring. Gordon R. Hall, Justice, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
Print Case Save Case 
Counsel 
John C. Backlund, Provo, Utah for Plaintiff. 
P. Gary Ferrero, Provo, Utah for Defendant. 
Opinion 
Opinion by: MAUGHAN 
{629 P.2d 426} Plaintiff initiated this proceeding pursuant to an order to show cause to enforce a provision 
in a decree of divorce entered in November, 1968. Thereunder, defendant was ordered "to pay any medical 
or dental expenses which may be incurred for medical or dental care of the two minor daughters of the 
parties." Upon hearing before the trial court, plaintiff was awarded judgment in the sum of $ 1,184.20. 
Defendant appeals challenging the award of two of the components of that sum. The judgment is affirmed. 
In this proceeding plaintiff filed an affidavit averring that defendant was in default in the payment of $ 
3,395.24 for medical, hospital, and dental bills for the minor daughters of the parties. By stipulation the 
parties agreed that plaintiff had procured at her own expense medical insurance, which had covered all 
the medical expenses except $ 258.88 for doctor bills and $ 73.32 for prescription drugs. The latter 
sums had been paid by plaintiff, which defendant agreed he should reimburse. On appeal defendant 
concedes plaintiff should have judgment for these expenses. 
Over a period of three years plaintiff had paid $ 1,538.12 in premiums for medical insurance, for which 
she sought reimbursement The trial court awarded her $ 700 as reimbursement for insurance 
premiums. In addition, plaintiff was awarded $ 125.00 for her attorney's fee. 
The defendant vigorously contended that the trial court could not order reimbursement for any of the 
insurance premiums on the basis of an order issued in 1975. In October 1975, an order to show cause 
was issued, averring defendant was in default in the payment of medical bills in the sum of $ 1,378.98. 
During the ensuing proceeding, plaintiff sought reimbursement in the sum of $ 135.00 for premiums for 
medical insurance paid from September 1974 through October 1975. The court ordered defendant to 
pay $ 1,250.00 to a doctor, and $ 45.60 to plaintiff. However, the court denied plaintiff reimbursement 
for the insurance premiums. The following was included in the order: 
"Defendant not found responsible to provide medical insurance for the two minor daughters of the 
parties." 
In the present proceeding the trial court stated that technically under the terms of the 1975 order he 
could not award plaintiffjudgmentforthe insurance premiums that she had paid. However, he could do 
something with respect to defendant's liability to pay the medical bills. The court stated: 
"Well, as I indicated, I think that those premiums were actually a necessary medical expense incurred 
© 2003 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions 
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
for the children." 
{629 P.2d 427} The trial court limited plaintiffs right to reimbursement of the insurance premiums as a 
medical expense to a period of approximately two years (1977 and 1978) and awarded her $ 700.00. 
On appeal defendant contends the order requiring defendant to reimburse plaintiff $ 700 for medical 
insurance is invalid. First he urges the current order modified the order of 1975, and such modification 
cannot be sustained inasmuch as plaintiff failed to prove a substantial change of circumstances. He 
further argues that in the absence of proof of change of circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata 
applies, since his responsibility to provide medical insurance had been litigated and determined by the 
1975 order. Secondly, defendant contends that if the requisite proof were adduced to justify a 
modification, such a modification cannot be applied retroactively, which was the effect of the present 
order for reimbursement. 
Defendant has misconstrued the order of the trial court. Medical and dental expenses in the sum of $ 
3,395.24 were incurred for the care of the children. Under the decree of divorce, defendant was liable 
for this expense. Plaintiff providently procured and paid for medical insurance which covered these 
expenses, with the exceptions set forth ante. This medical insurance did not redound to defendant's 
benefit and discharge his liability under the decree. The trial court, sitting as a court of equity, pertaining 
to its powers concerning obligations arising under a decree of divorcel exercised its equitable powers 
and limited defendant's liability to the cost of the insurance premiums rather than ordering defendant to 
discharge the entire obligation for medical expenses in the sum of $ 3,395.24. Within this context, the 
trial court correctly ruled that the premiums were actually a necessary medical expense for the 
children.2 
Defendant further contends the award of $ 125.00 attorney's fees to plaintiff cannot be sustained. 
Defendant cites and relies on Kerr v. KerrZ wherein this Court stated: 
" Pursuant to statute [ Section 30-3-3, U.C.A., 1953] a court in a divorce proceeding is 
empowered to award such sums as will permit the opposing party to bring or defend the action. 
The decision to make such an award, together with the amount thereof, rest primarily with the 
sound discretion of the trial court. As with the award of alimony, however, an award of attorneys' 
fees must rest on the basis of evidence of need and reasonableness."4 
Defendant claims there was no evidence adduced as to the need of plaintiff for attorney's fees to 
enable her to prosecute this action, or the reasonableness of the amount awarded. The record does 
reveal that this proceeding is the third one plaintiff has been compelled to prosecute to enforce the 
medical expenses provision in the decree. Although there was no detailed presentation of facts 
establishing the usual requisite factors to support an award of attorney's fees, the facts implicit in this 
proceeding and the evidence necessarily presented to the trial judge, together with the de minimis 
nature of the award constitute a sufficient basis to sustain the trial court's exercise of its discretion 
herein. 
WE CONCUR: I. Daniel Stewart, Justice, Richard C. Howe, Justice, Dallin H. Oaks, Justice. 
Concur 
Concur by: HALL 
Dissent 
Dissent by: HALL 
HALL, Justice: (Concurring and Dissenting). 
I concur with the main opinion except as to its disposition of the issue of attorney's fees. 
© 2003 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions 
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
{629 P.2d 428} The majority of the Court cites no authority for holding that the requisite evidentiary 
basis for an award of attorney's fees may arise by mere implication, or that an award may be made if it 
be de minimis. Indeed, it appears that there is none. 
An award of attorney's fees must be based upon direct evidence adduced at trial as to: 1) need, 2) 
ability to pay, and 3) reasonableness of the fee to be awarded.1 As stated in the case of Butler v. 
Butler:2 
This court has consistently held that an attorney's fee may not be awarded where there is nothing in the 
record to sustain the award either by way of evidence or by stipulation of the parties as to how the court 
may fix it.3 [Emphasis added, citations omitted.] 
I would vacate the award of attorney's fees. 
Footnotes 
Footnotes 
1 Despain v. Despain, Utah, 610 P.2d 1303 (1980). 
2 The trial judge in the present proceeding was the judge who issued the 1975 order. The judge 
stated in reference to this prior order that he did not intend to relieve defendant of liability for all medical 
expenses, if plaintiff elected to procure her own medical insurance. The judge commented that what he 
had in mind was that it might be cheaper for defendant to pay the medical bills rather than to carry 
insurance. 
3 Utah, 610 P.2d 1380,1384 (1980). 
4 Also see Kallas v. Kallas, Utah, 614 P.2d 641, 646 (1980). 
1 Kerr v. Kerr, Utah, 610 P.2d 1380 (1980). 
2 23 Utah 2d 259, 461 P.2d 727 (1969). 
3 Id. at p. 261. See also, Adams v. Adams, Utah, 593 P.2d 147 (1979); Lincoln Financial Corp. v. 
Ferrier, Utah, 567 P.2d 1102 (1977); Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971); John 
Deere Company of Moline v. Behling, 26 Utah 2d 30,484 P.2d 170 (1971); Brasher Motor and Finance 
Co. v. Anderson, 20 Utah 2d 104,433 P.2d 608 (1967); FMA. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 
2d 80,404 P.2d 670 (1965). 
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